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Originally established in 1999, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 
was re-established in 2013 as a Non Departmental Public Body. Although accountable to the 
Department for Health and Social Care (DHSC), NICE is operationally independent of 
government.  The Secretary of State (SoS) may intervene “if NICE fails to discharge its 
functions”[1], but in practice, NICE was instituted such that neither ministers nor enraged 
pharmaceutical company chiefs could interfere with decisions. When NICE made its first 
controversial decision not to recommend Relenza in 1999, Frank Dobson backed NICE, 
ignoring raucous threats from Glaxo Wellcome to move their business abroad[2]. Dobson is 
quoted as saying to Rawlins (chairman of NICE), “I think we’d have had to back you 
regardless, whether you were right or wrong. Fortunately, you were right.”[2] This early 
precedent set the stage for how ‘political independence’ would work. The 2012 Health and 
Social Care Act “specifically prohibits the SoS from directing the institute about matters 
relating to the substance of NICE’s advice, guidance or recommendations.”[2] While it seems 
appropriate to safeguard NICE guidelines from pharmaceutical company lobbying, we 
consider whether political independence may render NICE insufficiently accountable, legally 
and scientifically. The 2018 stakeholder consultation on the draft depression guideline is 
considered as an example of how accountability operates in the context of a field in which 
there are multiple divergent expert opinions.   
 
The duty of the court 
NICE procedures were formed to comply with English administrative law. The principles that 
apply are general: to act lawfully, fairly and rationally. Rawlins notes that “the totality of 
published NICE guidance now totals over 1,100 items but only four have been considered at 
judicial review (JR) and the courts have quashed none”[2]. In fact, as discussed later, the 
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courts have upheld one judicial review challenge on appeal.  Nevertheless, Rawlins suggests 
that this lack of challenge is “testimony to the institute’s assiduous approach to meeting its 
legal obligations”. While this is possible, it is unlikely to be a satisfactory explanation. There 
are many reasons why JR proceedings are not pursued that are unrelated to the legal quality 
of decision taking. These include lack of awareness that JR is available; high costs of 
litigation; and lack of access to appropriate legal advice[3]. Of JRs that reach a hearing, 
around 50% are successful[4].     
 
The first JR concerning NICE was brought by a pharmaceutical company challenging the 
decision not to recommend their Alzheimer’s drug. One basis of this claim was that NICE’s 
decision was irrational. On this, the judge ruled: 
 
[t]he court has no part to play in adjudicating between the rival merits of the 
arguments of the experts, of whom there are many who take a view different from the 
Claimant’s experts.[5]  
 
Similarly, in a later JR concerning recommended treatments for ME, the judge quoted 
English case law from 1984:  
 
Where the existence or non-existence of a fact is left to the judgment and discretion of 
a public body and that fact involves a broad spectrum ranging from the obvious to the 
debatable to the just conceivable, it is the duty of the court to leave the decision of 
that fact to the body to whom Parliament has entrusted the decision making power 
save in a case where it is obvious that the public body, consciously or unconsciously, 
are acting perversely.[6]  
 
Therefore, while the legal duty to act rationally may apply in matters of scientific judgement, 
NICE appears largely free from legal accountability because courts tend to defer to experts; 
parliament has given NICE authority to decide among the various scientific arguments.  
 
In JRs against NICE, claims have tended to concern specific recommendations, often relating 
to a single drug. In contrast, during the 2018 stakeholder consultation on the draft depression 
guideline, fourteen professional and patient organisations jointly expressed methodological 
concerns relating to the way the guideline had been constructed in its entirety[7].  The 
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methodological points raised do not represent commercial interests, indeed if heeded, could 
potentially reduce commercial influence on the guideline. The six methodological points 
were: long-term trial outcomes should be examined; service user experience research should 
be reviewed; quality-of-life outcomes should be taken into account; sub-categories of 
depression should be in line with European and American bodies; partial recovery should be 
taken into account for severe depression; and Network Meta-Analysis (NMA) should be 
abandoned, following the Canadian guideline body, because it is “associated with serious and 
unique risks” with “no formal expert consensus yet established on its appropriateness for this 
type of review”[7]. In their formal response[8], the Guideline Committee (GC) stated that 
none of these points would be addressed in a third revision due for publication in February 
2020, largely on the grounds that the GC’s opinion differs. 
 
In previous JRs, courts have found in favour of NICE where the consultation process has 
been run in accordance with stated procedures and where NICE has provided a clear rationale 
for disagreeing with other scientific experts. This suggests that normally, even where 
differing scientific interpretations of evidence exist in relation to specific trials of specific 
treatments, NICE is protected from scientific challenge as long as its own stated procedures 
are followed properly. It remains to be tested whether this would still be the case if a JR were 
brought in which the divergent scientific opinions concerned the whole methodological 
approach and were expressed by a range of non-commercial stakeholders.  
 
In terms of governance, NICE is accountable to the SoS and not to parliament directly, while 
the SoS is accountable to parliament[1]. Although, thirty-one parliamentarians wrote jointly 
to NICE supporting stakeholder concerns about the depression guideline[9],  there is no direct 
imperative for NICE to take this into account. Whilst this may provide an appropriate form of 
defence from lobbying and commercial interests, in a case in which stakeholders’ concerns 
are not commercially driven and represent legitimate scientific debate in a controversial field, 




We now consider the extent to which NICE is accountable from a scientific perspective, 
irrespective of parliament or the courts. Although never a perfect system since its 
introduction by English scientific societies in the nineteenth century[10], scientific peer 
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review is regarded as a central component of scientific credibility. One of its early advocates 
saw it as a way to prevent the “veritable sewage thrown into the pure stream of science”[10].  
 
NICE employs stakeholder consultations for this function: 
 
Consultation with stakeholders is an integral part of the guideline development 
process. Comments received from registered stakeholders are a vital part of the 
quality-assurance and peer-review processes and it is important that they are 
addressed appropriately.[11] 
 
Any organisation may respond as a stakeholder, including pharmaceutical companies and 
those with financial links to them. The period allowed for consultation (normally 6 weeks) 
along with timelines for revision and final publication are not long enough for GCs to address 
methodological concerns raised at this stage; with the result that stakeholder consultations 
tend to manage stakeholder feedback in a superficial manner. There is no imperative for 
NICE to take on board stakeholder comments and NICE reserves the right not to publish or 
respond to comments that are too long. Relative to scientific publishing, this form of peer 
review process could be described as ‘light touch’, particularly as commercial companies 
may represent their interests via consultations on a par with any other stakeholder.  
 
There is nevertheless a greater degree of transparency in this process than with other 
guidelines. For example, the British Association for Psychopharmacology guideline for 
depression describes a similar process of inviting stakeholders to provide feedback on a 
draft[12]. It is also published in a peer reviewed journal and so presumably had to address 
reviewer feedback. Yet, none of this is transparent in the way that NICE publishes extensive 
documentation relating to consultations online. 
 
Moreover, because NICE combines its public body ‘duty to consult’ with scientific peer 
review, further legal duties extend from the consultation exercise. Public consultations are 
expected to follow a set of principles referred to as the ‘Gunning principles’§. These include 
                                                          
§ The Gunning principles were propounded by Mr. Stephen Sedley QC and adopted by Mr. Justice Hodgson in R v. Brent 
London Borough Council, ex parte Gunning (1985) 84 LGR 168 at 169. They were subsequently approved by Simon Brown 
LJ in R v. Devon County Council, ex parte Baker [1995] 1 All.E.R. 73 at 91g-j; and by the Court of Appeal in R v. North 
and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213 at [108]. 
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that the public body should “have an open mind during a consultation and not already have 
made the decision”.  In arguing that long-term outcomes of trials should be included in the 
guideline analysis, stakeholders noted in May 2018: 
 
Follow up data of 1-2 years have been omitted in the draft depression guideline…The 
Guideline Committee state that there are insufficient studies with long term follow up 
data to conduct such analyses. If this is the case then it is inappropriate for the 
guideline to make any firm recommendations for specific treatments based on (albeit 
large amounts of) short-term outcome data. Large amounts of poor evidence must not 
be used in place of small amounts of good evidence[7]. 
 
The GC formal response in October 2018 stated: 
 
Unfortunately, there is limited available data on long-term follow up and as a result 
the committee agreed prior to the examination of any evidence that this could not be 
the primary outcome for comparing treatment efficacy. But we used long-term data 
where possible. (…) if the committee had not made recommendations for interventions 
which only report short-term data, there would have been very few recommendations 
in the guideline, which would have severely limited its clinical utility.[8] 
 
It is possible that a rational mind (in the legal sense) might consider this response to fall short 
of addressing the specific point about small amounts of good evidence outweighing large 
amounts of inadequate evidence. It also includes an inaccuracy in that no follow-up data were 
used in the analysis. The result is that the best possible evidence has potentially been left out 
of the guideline. Rather than demonstrating an open mind, the GC restated their position prior 
to the consultation. Similar examples occur in response to each of the six methodological 
concerns, suggesting that decisions had already been made prior to consultation. Thus, the 
scale and transparency of the stakeholder consultation exercise could leave NICE open to 
greater accountability than a closed peer review process and in this sense, the means of 
holding NICE to account scientifically could paradoxically be via its legal duties as a public 
body.  
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Court of Appeal? 
In 2010, as noted earlier, the Court of Appeal quashed a decision by NICE[13]. Evidence 
concerning a drug’s efficacy had been rejected by NICE but accepted by another international 
body (the European Medicines Agency [EMA]). While NICE gave general reasons for their 
decision, the Court ruled that NICE ought to have given specific reasons why its decision 
differed to that of the EMA[10]. This decision draws on a core principle that legally rational 
decisions should be supported by reasons. NICE recognises this duty in their manual:  
 
Each comment must be acknowledged and answered as directly, fully and with as 
much information as possible… if no changes have been made, it should be clear from 
the response why not.[9] 
 
The duty to give reasons is normally only applicable in specific cases e.g. concerning 
personal liberty, fairness, or where a decision appears inexplicable[14]. Arguably, this duty 
exists in the context that concerns us here for a number of reasons, including that the 
guideline will impact on a very large number of individuals with depression and their 
families; that NICE acknowledge a duty to give reasons in their manual; and because the GC 
should explain when their decisions deviate from internationally recognised approaches. 
Specifically, stakeholders referred to NICE sub-categories of treatment-resistant and chronic 
depression deviating from the ICD and the DSM which group ‘persistent’ forms of 
depression together; and to reliance on NMA techniques as deviating from the Canadian 
Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health approach.   
 
Conclusion 
The Dobson-Rawlins pact appears to have been seeking to protect NICE from commercial 
lobbying either directly or via parliamentarians, which many would agree is a laudable 
principle. Yet, it might be considered undesirable should this level of protection extend to 
handing over to NICE the status of ultimate scientific authority particularly in fields where 
not only the findings of evidence are routinely contested across the professional and scientific 
spectrum, but so are the methodologies and underpinning conceptualisations of the condition 
of interest.  
 
While successful JR challenges to NICE decisions are rare, they are not unknown and JR 
remains a possible route for those seeking to question NICE.  NICE is subject to English law 
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and is required to adhere to a high level of transparency in terms of its duties as a public 
body; this undoubtedly exceeds accountability within closed peer review systems. Yet there 
are aspects of the English legal and parliamentary system which impede scientific 
accountability by virtue of the fact that courts tend to defer to the expert appointed by 
parliament. Considering the precedent set by the one successful challenge to NICE, it may be 
argued that NICE has a legal duty to explain why its approach and conclusions differ to those 
of a body of equivalent standing outside of the UK. This is particularly important where, as 
here, expert opinions of UK professionals support the approach taken by these expert bodies. 
What began as a strategy to defend NHS care from global commercial interests, may instead 
have become a barrier to healthy scientific process and subsequently good care for millions of 
UK citizens who need or will need NHS support for depression. Perhaps in recognition of 
this, NICE have recently taken the unusual step of inviting concerned stakeholders to a 
‘workshop’ pending the third revision, to discuss methodological concerns; the impact of this 
on the final guideline will not be known until the guideline is published in 2020. 
 
Recent critiques of guideline development processes outside of the UK have argued that there 
has been an excess of professional and commercial conflicts-of-interest. From a North 
American perspective, for example, “hundreds and thousands of designated guideline authors 
coshare in the society-wide power game across a large portfolio of guidelines and statements 
that improve, fine tune, or manipulate disease definition and management… this creates a 
massive, clan-like, group self-citation network”[15].  It has been suggested that “clinical 
practice guidelines should be multidisciplinary in composition, independent of the governing 
bodies of medical specialty societies and strive to reduce fee-for-service conflicts of 
interest”[16]. NICE guidelines should in theory be less susceptible to these afflictions, but 
may have inadvertently become closed to methodological disputation with the same 
consequences where, for example, methodological choices such as prioritising short-term 
outcomes over long-term ones shine a better light on some treatments compared to others. A 
counterbalance to these conflicts of interest could be to strengthen citizen participation 
throughout the whole guideline development process[17] and to improve engagement with 
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